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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
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                          SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
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    ALEK SCHOTT,
    Plaintiff,
                                  Case Number
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                                  SA:23-CV-00706-OLG-RBF
    VS.
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                                ) San Antonio, Texas
    JOEL BABB, ET AL,
     6
    Defendants.
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               MOTION HEARING (via Zoom Videoconference)
                 BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD B. FARRER
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                     UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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(December 12, 2024, 10:00 a.m.)
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              THE COURT: This is Richard Farrer.
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    Magistrate Judge. Can you all hear me and see me okay?
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             MS. HEBERT: Yes, Your Honor.
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             MR. WINDHAM: Yes, Your Honor.
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             MR. FRIGERIO: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Great. Let's go ahead and get started
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     then. So we're on the record, this is SA:23-CV-00706-OLG,
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     Schott versus Babb, et al. Why don't we just start with
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     appearances. Counsel for plaintiff?
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             MS. HEBERT: Good morning, Your Honor. Christi Hebert
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     for plaintiff, and I'm joined by my colleagues, Josh Windham
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     and Josh Fox.
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             MR. WINDHAM: Good morning, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Good morning. And for defendants?
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             MR. FRIGERIO: Charles Frigerio for Bexar County and
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     Deputy Molina.
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              THE COURT: Good morning to you as well. So we've
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    aot --
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             MR. FRIGERIO: And Mr. Blair Leake is representing
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    Deputy Babb.
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              THE COURT: Thank you. Sorry, counsel. Good morning
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    to you as well, Mr. Leake. Okay, so we've got two matters on
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     the calendar this morning. The first is a motion to exclude an
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expert, Palacios, this is plaintiff's expert, and then there's plaintiff's motion to quash some subpoenas. Why don't we start with the motion to exclude and why don't I start with you, Mr. Frigerio.

MR. FRIGERIO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it your motion or is it Mr. Leake's?

MR. FRIGERIO: It's Bexar County's motion and Deputy Molina's motion, Your Honor. It was timely filed within the timeframe of this Court's docket control order with the filing of the expert report. And we filed the motion to strike based on the fact that this expert, Mr. Palacios, is basically looking at the video from the plaintiff, Mr. Schott, and is interpreting the video and giving his opinions about what he interprets from the video which is very similar to Roundtree versus San Antonio where Judge Chestney excluded an expert who was testifying using again body-worn camera and saying and making conclusions as to whether or not — I believe that was an excessive force case and to whether or not the officers acted appropriately.

This individual, Mr. Palacios, makes many conclusions, one about the fog line, which I believe the jurors can look at the video themselves and determine whether or not the fog line was crossed. Second of all, he also gives legal conclusions which are, I believe, inadmissible and we are objecting to that as to how long you have to be across the fog line before it is

1	a violation of the law. And third, he makes credibility
2	determinations with regard to Deputy Babb as to what he
3	concludes as to what he believes Deputy Babb could or could not
4	see, and those conclusions are based on speculation and again
5	off the video that he is claiming to have which he did view,
6	but he's drawing all these conclusions off the video which is
7	not going to enhance the jury because the jury can look at the
8	video themselves and determine what had occurred.
9	THE COURT: Okay. And you didn't depose him; is that
10	right?
11	MR. FRIGERIO: We have a deposition scheduled, but we
12	did not depose him yet. I believe it's scheduled for January.
13	THE COURT: But you're going to depose him. Should we
14	wait until after you've deposed him then to take this issue up?
15	MR. FRIGERIO: I don't believe so, Your Honor. We did
16	not actually set the deposition. Deputy Babb set the
17	deposition of the expert.
18	THE COURT: Okay.
19	MR. FRIGERIO: That's whatever the Court wants, if you
20	would prefer.
21	THE COURT: I guess you're proceeding with that
22	deposition at that time by agreement with the other side?
23	Isn't that right? I guess Mr. Leake might be better informed
24	on that issue. Is that how you're going forward with that one?

MR. FRIGERIO: You're on mute, Blair.

25

1	THE COURT: Sorry, we're not picking you up on the
2	sound.
3	MS. HEBERT: Blair's sound is not working. I'll just
4	speak until he can figure out his sound. Mr. Windham is going
5	to respond on our side for the motion to exclude, but we have
6	his deposition actually set for next week and Blair noticed
7	that deposition, scheduled it, and we are presenting Sergeant
8	Palacios on Thursday next week.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. LEAKE: And hopefully is my microphone working
11	now?
12	MR. FRIGERIO: Yes.
13	MR. LEAKE: Great, I second what Ms. Hebert said.
14	THE COURT: All right, great. Let me just hear
15	unless, Mr. Frigerio, there's more you want to say. Obviously
16	I've read the motion, but anything else you want to emphasize
17	before I get the opposing perspective?
18	MR. FRIGERIO: No, Your Honor. I believe that covers
19	it.
20	THE COURT: All right. Well, why don't we hear the
21	response then.
22	MR. WINDHAM: Thank you, Your Honor. And Josh Windham
23	for Alek Schott. So Sergeant Palacios offers routine accident
24	reconstruction testimony, the sort of testimony that courts and
25	juries across the country hear pretty much every day when

deciding how to get to the bottom of what happened during a traffic incident. The only difference here is that this case isn't about, you know, who caused the car accident, but whether my client's tires crossed over the painted line on the left side of the highway before Deputy Babb pulled him over. And the expert testimony here helps clarify that factual issue.

None of the County's objections justify striking it.

I want to start with Rule 702 which the County's motion doesn't really address, but which I think does add some helpful context to this discussion. So Sergeant Palacios is qualified, his testimony is relevant, and his testimony is reliable. I'll start with qualifications briefly. He's got a 24-year career in law enforcement that included highway patrol, writing tickets for things like failure to maintain a lane. He parleyed that career into a 17-year career in accident reconstruction where he analyzes car movements in lines of sight. That's obviously more knowledge and experience than the ordinary person has which is all 702 requires.

The testimony is relevant. One of the main questions in this case is whether Deputy Babb actually saw a traffic violation. If we had Deputy Babb's dash cam footage, we can all just watch it and see for ourselves, but we don't have that footage because Deputy Babb turned off his camera right before the supposed violation. So we've got to use Alek's dash cam footage, which is helpful, but it doesn't directly show his

exclusion.

tires or Deputy Babb's perspective, which is where Sergeant
Palacios's testimony comes in. And he visited the site of the
stop, he took measurements, he ran test drives, he drew a few
conclusions that you just can't get from watching Alek's dash
cam on its own. One of those conclusions is that Alek's tires
are wider than the distance between the painted line and the
rumble strip, so if Alek had crossed over the line, you would
have heard that on his dash cam footage. Two, if Alek had
crossed or even touched the line, the ridges on his hood, which
are all you can see on Alek's video, would have been further to
the left on the video than they were. And number three, Deputy
Babb's perpendicular angle on the side of the road wouldn't
have allowed him to see Alek's tires on the left side of his
car. All three of those points will help the fact finder
determine whether Deputy Babb saw a traffic violation, which
again, you can't get just from watching Alek's video.
Now, reliability. The testimony is reliable, it flows
from his decades of experience in highway patrol, accident
reconstruction. It relies on site measurements and test
drives, and it draws clear, easy to follow conclusions about
where Alek's tires were positioned and what Deputy Babb was
able to see. If the County has concerns about the substance of

So let me address the County's three specific

that analysis, that's an issue for cross-examination, not for

objections which Mr. Frigerio kind of just covered. About the
video, he's not just watching the video and narrating it like
the experts were in all the cases that the County cites.
Instead, what he's doing is he's going to the site, taking
measurements, and providing information that informs the jury
or this Court at summary judgment when it's watching the video.
It will give the fact finder more information so that it can
understand what the video is actually showing. That's not
anything like what their cases involve, it's more like the
testimony from the Fifth Circuit decision in Alvarado-Zarza or
in Davis, from Judge Pitman's decision.

Now, as for speculation, the County says that Sergeant Palacios is speculating about what Deputy Babb's state of mind was. He isn't, he's offering opinions about where Alek's tires were located and what Deputy Babb's field of vision would have allowed him to see. Those opinions are based on measurements and test drives that he coordinated himself. None of that involves speculation, it's basing an opinion on facts or data which is what Rule 702(b) requires.

Now, finally, regarding the law, we agree, of course, that, generally speaking, experts can't give legal conclusions, but the few lines in the report about traffic law are just there to provide some context for his analysis. At summary judgment, this Court will, of course, draw its own conclusions about what Texas traffic law is. If the claim goes to trial,

the County can seek a limiting instruction about the scope of
his testimony. But at this stage, there's no basis for
striking the entirety of his report which is what the County
seeks to do based on a few lines about traffic law.

Now, one final point. I just want to reiterate if
Deputy Babb had not turned off his dash camera at the moment of
truth, we wouldn't be here talking about this. We could all
just watch the video and argue about what he saw, but we don't
have that video, we have Alek's video, and Sergeant Palacios's
analysis provides some helpful information for the fact finder
that will allow it to assess what the video shows. Striking
his testimony wouldn't just be legally wrong, it would be I
think unjust because it would allow the County to benefit from
Babb's choice to thwart the best evidence of what he saw. I
don't think the Court should allow that, and so we'd ask that
the motion to strike be denied.

(Pause.)

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MR. FRIGERIO: Judge, we can't hear you.

THE COURT: You can't hear me?

MR. FRIGERIO: No, you were off for a second.

THE COURT: All right. Can you hear me now?

MR. FRIGERIO: Yes.

THE COURT: All right, there we go. So, counsel, just break down for me, just provide an example, maybe a hypothetical, what would be impermissible just sort of play by

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play of the video versus sort of what you're talking about here. Just explain to me a little further sort of how you anticipate this is going to go or would go if there's a deposition or if there's testimony at a trial.

MR. WINDHAM: Right, so I think a case involving play by play, Castro is a case that they cite from the Western District of Texas, 2022. There, there's an expert who is testifying about -- he's a safety expert, it's a slip-and-fall case. The expert was basically narrating the video as the jury was watching it and testifying about the condition of the mat that everybody could see in the video. The difference here is that we can't all see the fact at issue. We can't see from Alek's video where the tires are located. That's where Sergeant Palacios comes in. He provides measurements of Alek's car and he determines where the tires are located in relation to ridges on the hood. So that information will allow the jury to say, okay, based on the spot of the ridges on the road, we know where his tires are. We don't have information here at least about what Deputy Babb can see from his angle, so we had to have Sergeant Palacios go out to the side of the road and to the exact spot where Deputy Babb was, which the jury can't do because we're talking about a dangerous highway with cars flying by. Having an expert go and stand in that spot and take photos as we recreate Alek's driving provides a pretty good example of what Deputy Babb could or couldn't have seen from

his angle on the side of the road.

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THE COURT: Okay. And then what would be sort of crossing the line, no pun intended, on legal conclusions, right? What can the expert say that informs the sort of probable cause issue here and what is something that the expert you wouldn't anticipate would be allowed to say?

MR. WINDHAM: So I agree that to the extent Sergeant Palacios characterizes Texas traffic law as such and says this is a violation and this isn't, that's not binding on the Court, of course. And so to the extent that that's in the report, I think it's -- the Court isn't bound by that, but it also doesn't justify striking the entire report. That said, his testimony about what actually happened factually forms the basis of the conclusion that the jury might reach about whether a traffic violation was committed. At the end of the day, this is about what Deputy Babb saw, what he observed. We know that from Ren(ph), we know that from Cole. It's about what he saw that day. Did he see a violation? And having an expert provide some information about where the tires are located in relation to ridges on Alek's hood, what Deputy Babb's field of vision did and did not include, that's all helpful information the jury can consider and that will allow it to watch the video with a bit more context.

(Pause.)

MR. FRIGERIO: Judge, you're on mute again. I'm not

sure what's going on.

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THE COURT: What's going on? How about now?

MR. FRIGERIO: Now you're on.

MR. WINDHAM: It works.

THE COURT: Who knows. Is that the kind of state of mind issue that Mr. Frigerio is talking about? In other words, if you're talking about what Deputy Babb saw or didn't saw as opposed to what a person in that position could see or, you know, sort of is that the distinction here? What's he getting at when he's talking about state of mind opinions, at least from your perspective?

MR. WINDHAM: So I hesitate to characterize Mr. Frigerio's argument, but I take him to be saying that Sergeant Palacios can't testify about what Deputy Babb thought. And the report if you read it isn't about what Deputy Babb thought one way or the other. What he thought is legally irrelevant under the Ren(ph) case. The question is what an officer in his shoes could have seen that day, and that's what Sergeant Palacios's testimony is all about, what he was able to see, what his field of vision was and where Alek's tires actually were in relation to the ridges on his hood, which again, you can't see from Alek's video because we don't have those measurements unless you have an expert go out there and take them.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I got you. Thank you.

Mr. Frigerio, anything in reply?

MR. FRIGERIO: In reply, Your Honor, I do not feel that the expert's opinion will aid the jury. The jury can well look at the camera from Mr. Schott and make their own determination. As to the expert, Mr. Palacios, testifying to the state of mind or what he believes, this expert believes what Deputy Babb could or could not see, I believe that's speculation and that should be inadmissible. And I believe that counsel has now admitted that the legal conclusions that are in the report should be inadmissible as well.

THE COURT: And are they correct at characterizing your motion as seeking to strike the expert in his entirety?

MR. FRIGERIO: Yes, Your Honor, but really the three issues that we're dealing with were the ones that I just described, the fog line, the violation of and legal conclusions of law and the state of mind of Deputy Babb.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I appreciate it.

Look, I'm comfortable with the argument from plaintiff with respect to establishing just at least for gatekeeping purposes the bona fides of this expert and this sort of baseline reliability. I don't think there's a basis here to exclude the expert in its entirety, and I appreciate the acknowledgment that to the extent that the report might sort of overreach or overstep here or there, there's limiting instructions available if we're going to be pretrial, and obviously the Court is not going to be bound by — so all that is to say I'm going to deny

the motion to exclude.

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Let's go on to the motion to quash. This is plaintiff's motion, so why don't I stay with your side, Ms. Hebert. And which of you or your colleagues is going to present your argument on that one?

MS. HEBERT: Thank you, Your Honor, and I will present our argument on the motion to quash. Just as context for Your Honor, plaintiff is asking the Court to quash two overbroad third-party subpoenas that defendants have e-mailed to Ms. Casey who is a therapist that Alek saw and his employer, RMS. And quite frankly, defendants can't bear their burden of showing the necessity of these third-party subpoenas. for all records pertaining to Alek Schott and they aren't tailored to this dispute at all. They are served by a third-party record retrieval company which is not in and of itself of course a problem, but it illustrates the fact that these are just broad generic third-party subpoenas that someone who is not familiar with the case serves or sends off, and they seek every scrap of information pertaining to Alek. All e-mails, all performance evaluations, all benefits records, so just incredibly broad. And within that scope, they seek irrelevant information, information that Alek has already provided and, therefore, there's no necessity to subject a third party to discovery burdens.

And then they also seek privileged and confidential

1	information. The privileged information is the therapy notes
2	from this therapist. And in the court-ordered conference that
3	this Court asked us to do before this hearing, counsel for
4	defendants indicated that the only thing they're really seeking
5	from the therapist is the therapy notes. And those therapy
6	notes are at the heart of the psychotherapist/patient
7	privilege, which is recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
8	case of Jaffee, and that the Fifth Circuit has also
9	subsequently recognized in a case called Murra, and other
10	District Courts in this Circuit have also recognized. Now,
11	Murra is a
12	THE COURT: Haven't you put that information
13	MR. FRIGERIO: Can't hear you, Judge.
14	MS. HEBERT: I'm sorry, Judge, your volume is really
15	low.
16	THE COURT: I wonder why.
17	MS. HEBERT: I just turned you up on mine. Whatever
18	you did I think there might be a lag.
19	THE COURT: I appreciate you all just letting me know
20	when you can't hear me, so please keep doing that.
21	I'm just asking you, haven't you put these notes at
22	issue by seeking damages for mental anguish? And assuming
23	hypothetically that is the case and that this type of
24	information is discoverable, talk to me about a little bit
25	about those damages. And in the motion you talk about sort of

garden variety mental anguish, maybe you could explain to me
what you're getting at there.

MS. HEBERT: Sure. And I would direct Your Honor to
two very relevant cases. One that is Stafford versus New

Dairy, that's a 2024 case out of the Northern District, and

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Dairy, that's a 2024 case out of the Northern District, and then one from the Western District out of 2023, and that's Flemming versus Methodist Hospital, by Judge Chestney. And both of those cases say that merely alleging in your complaint some emotional distress situation doesn't waive, doesn't put it in issue someone's mental -- doesn't waive the privilege to therapy notes. And I'm going to just read the quote from Chestney about what was alleged in that complaint. plaintiff in a employment dispute alleged she suffered embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience, mental and physical distress, loss of enjoyment of life, much broader than what we allege here which is just like minor stress and anxiety. And Judge Chestney found that that is garden variety emotional distress damages and doesn't waive the psychotherapist/patient privilege to protect notes, because that's kind of a sacred privilege to be able to talk to your therapist. And for someone like Alek, why this is so important, Your Honor, is that it would penalize a plaintiff like Alek who has a constitutional violation and has suffered some stress and anxiety about it, talks to their therapist, any time a plaintiff suffers stress or anxiety from a tort or

constitutional violation, they would be penalized by going to a
therapist because that record, that communication with that
therapist would then be discoverable. And it also opens up
every plaintiff who brings a constitutional case to some

searching inquiry into their therapy records.

So from a policy perspective, it is really bad policy to say that every time you put I suffered some stress or anxiety as a result of the violation of my constitutional rights, that means you waive your privilege to confidential communications with your therapist. And there is a different type of situation where you put your mental condition as part of a claim or as a cause of action in issue, and the cases that find that waiver they tend to be things like personal injury lawsuits where there are severe physical injuries or severe mental injuries and the plaintiffs in those cases are relying on medical experts and so would not be fair to allow a plaintiff to shield that information.

But here we're not introducing the therapist as a witness, we're not relying on her notes, we're not relying on that evidence, and in fact, we're not really relying on the fact that he went to therapy at all. He's going to talk about his own emotional reaction to the violation of his constitutional rights. It's irrelevant whether he went to therapy or not.

THE COURT: But is he seeking compensation for that?

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MS. HEBERT: He is seeking compensation for his stress and anxiety, but if the Court finds that there is a waiver in merely alleging stress and anxiety, he will pull those claims down because we don't believe that that is a fair penalty for a plaintiff, and so we refuse to waive that privilege.

THE COURT: Okay. And then you talked briefly about the employment records. Anything else you want to mention about those?

MS. HEBERT: Yeah, I guess the broader perspective is they're just incredibly searching, and defendants haven't really anchored that to any particular part of their case that they are looking to prove. And to the extent that they're saying there's some element of damages, that's not enough for this broad request to get all of his employment records and that's been found by other courts not to be enough. And to the extent they're trying to say that there is a — that the employment records are potentially relevant to his travel patterns or his job duties, there's no reason why they can't request that information from Alek himself and have to subject a third party to discovery burdens.

And I'll add a finer minor point, Your Honor, which we say pales in comparison to the substantive points, but the procedural point is that these subpoenas have not been personally served. And courts in this Circuit generally require personal service for a subpoena, but to the extent

as --

1	there's any case for an alternative form of service, defendants
2	just can't show that they've diligently attempted to serve
3	these subpoenas. They made one call to each of the respective
4	recipients. There's some allegation that a process server
5	tried to get into the airport hanger, but our client didn't
6	know who they were and we don't represent RMS. And then
7	there's handwritten notes that the process server resorted to
8	e-mail, and defendants are just saying, you know, e-mail should
9	be enough in this case. And that, quite frankly, doesn't
10	satisfy the rules without a diligent attempt to serve and that
11	this Court then blesses.
12	THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Who would like to talk
13	on the other side? Is that you, Mr. Frigerio?
14	MR. FRIGERIO: Yes, Your Honor. We went through
15	obviously a third party, Kim Tindall & Associates, which was
16	bought out by Magna Services. It's a typical it's how you
17	obtain records. There's nothing unusual about that, so as far
18	as service is concerned, they couldn't personally serve them,
19	they contacted them by e-mail, and then the motion was filed.
20	And of course, we ordered that to be stopped, the process,

THE COURT: Talk to me about that. I mean, it's some limitation, but I mean this stop happened in 2022, right? So

until the Court were to rule on the substance of the subpoenas

themselves. They are limited to a five-year period. As far

why --

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MR. FRIGERIO: Yes, Your Honor. I would be willing to even make it even further, maybe a year before or year after. I mean, we need to have some — I thought five years was limiting enough. I'd be willing to limit it more, but the issue is you can't have your cake and eat it too. You can't sue for damages and then say the only person that he has seen, the only healthcare provider he has seen as a result of this incident was Ms. Casey. And then they turn around and say you can't have the records.

THE COURT: What are you going to do with those records at this point? Right? Your time to get an expert on him is over, so what's the value of these records now? This sort of — I think you've just conceded, concededly overly broad, maybe you're not conceding it, but I think we've arrived at the point that five years of counseling records seems overly broad as well as employment records. So, you know, what are you going to do with this stuff now?

MR. FRIGERIO: I mean, we're entitled to them in case when we go to trial we'll need to know whether or not he really did suffer an anxiety. Maybe he did and maybe he didn't, we need to know. We're entitled to be able to have those records. The case that we cited, Braymiller, that was a discrimination case in employment against Lowe's, and that was Judge Mathy who determined that once you're suing for damages of mental

anguish, that you waive that and you are entitled -- the defense is entitled to those records, and I don't think there's any question about that.

MR. LEAKE: Your Honor, may I add something here?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. LEAKE: There was testimony in his deposition along the lines of things like he lost sleep because of this for six months. Well, he also had a brand new child at that time, and so if he's going through a rough time and talking to his therapist and telling his therapist, look, I'm not sleeping at night because my child is crying all night, that's going to show that, hey, him losing sleep and him saying that it's about this incident, he's told his therapist that it's actually due to the fact that he's got a young child at home, etc. He's alleged all these things in his deposition that, you know, he believes he suffered this anxiety, stress, etc., we're entitled to see whether or not he has alternative causes for those stressors and anxieties. And so, you know, the pendency, the duration of when we're talking about temporally, I think that does come into place. And while Mr. Frigerio did request the records, you know, if he didn't do it, I was going to do it, and so I would agree with Mr. Frigerio that this goes to the heart of their damages.

There's no use of force here. There's no personal injury. At that point, it comes down to a constitutional

## MOTION HEARING

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violation on its own. What is that worth? And what is his
emotional anguish worth? So this is our only chance to get
some sort of secondary look at what happened to him emotionally
other than what he's telling his self, which is obviously
biased.

MS. HEBERT: Your Honor, may I respond to that?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. HEBERT: Kind of two points and I want to address the Braymiller case first. That's a case where it's a diversity case and it's Texas law that's being applied, and what the Court is actually citing is Texas Rule of Evidence 509 which is completely different than the federal privilege rule. The Texas 509 Rule is a physician/patient privilege and that gets automatically waived under the Texas Rule of Evidence if any party puts at issue a mental condition, so completely different standard. And then from the facts, they're very different here. In that case, the plaintiff was alleging breathing problems and sleeping problems that were like much broader than what's going on here.

And to the extent that Mr. Leake is drawing to the deposition testimony, that illustrates exactly Mr. Leake's point. You can cross-examine plaintiff on those issues, Didn't you have a six-month child at home, didn't you have other things going on? And Mr. Leake in the deposition, we limited, we objected to the extent that there were discussions of what

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Mr. Schott told his therapist, but it's well within Mr. Leake and Mr. Frigerio's right to examine Mr. Schott on what other factual circumstances are going on in Mr. Schott's life, but what is protected is the communications between a therapist and the patient. And the Supreme Court likens that communication privilege to a spousal communication privilege, to an attorney/client communication privilege, the idea that you can communicate freely because of policy reasons, quite frankly, rather than the facts which are discoverable, as Mr. Leake has already referenced.

THE COURT: Okay. So, you know, I think there's a bit of a sliding scale in these situations. Certainly information pertaining to the plaintiff's anxiety and treatment for it, it's relevant, but we're really looking at a sort of one information and also proportionality. And so once I start to think about that, then I look at the context of this request. It's a request sort of broadly sent for five years of, you know, extremely confidential or personal information, along with five years of work records, again for an event that takes place in 2022. And it's sort of -- I guess the message I receive is, okay, well, then the Court can kind of figure it out, the Court can narrow something or the Court can fashion something, but I decline to do that. I'm not a lawyer in this case, I don't represent either of the parties and I don't think it's my job to jump in and roll up my sleeves and conduct your

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discovery for you all. This is something that you all should

2 be able to do and I should be addressing here today a vastly

3 narrower and tailored request that's been properly served and

4 that has some sort of assurances for me from both sides that

5 efforts have been made to try to sort of accommodate each

6 side's concerns. But instead, you all are miles apart and the

7 party that I think is -- the parties that I think are further

8 from the sort of reasonable position that I want you to be in

9 are the requesters here, are the defendants. You know, yes,

you probably can get some of this information, but when you ask 10

11 for five years of it, it looks like a fishing expedition and

12 it's just not a good look.

> So based on the request that I have and the record in front of me, I'm going to go ahead and grant the motion. Whether there's an opportunity to seek this information in a different way or to seek some subset of information or to approach this more thoughtfully, I'll leave that up to you within the confines of your scheduling order, but you know, obviously plaintiffs have raised some pretty powerful and strong arguments about the sanctity of this type of information in a case like this where the mental anguish at issue is relatively minor, I think everybody would agree in the scope of things. Maybe there can be some sort of stipulations or understandings about what that means in terms of how it would

translate into requests for damages in a case, you know, maybe

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we're not talking about 20 million-dollar request for damages or even a one million-dollar request, I don't know. But you know, I think those kinds of discussions would sort of inform this request. Maybe there's other ways to preserve Mr. Schott's privacy and around some of these other things that might have been discussed that maybe wouldn't be relevant to the issue at hand. I know that you all defendants are looking to see if there's other issues that could be the cause of the alleged mental anguish, but again, this is, like counsel said, garden variety, low-dollar mental anguish, and so I just don't think there's enough here to justify sort of pushing forward. And I'm not going to pull out my scalpel at this stage to perform surgery on these requests, so I'm going to go ahead and grant the motion to quash the subpoenas. Is there anything further, Mr. Frigerio?

MR. FRIGERIO: No, Your Honor, but I take it you're not precluding us from filing another Subpoena Duces Tecum that is more tailored.

THE COURT: I'm not, but -- you know, I'm not impressed by these discovery requests. So if you do it and you seek it, you better do it carefully and you better do it right, and I would confer with opposing counsel significantly before doing that. Reach an agreement because assessing these arguments again on a subsequent request after you've already been to the well once, if it doesn't look like it's a slam dunk

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to me, then I'll shift fees if I assess that motion. Anything
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     further from you, Mr. Leake?
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              MR. LEAKE: No, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Hebert, anything from you or
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     your team?
              MS. HEBERT: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Thanks, everyone. I'll just issue
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     a brief written order that really just references the reasons
     stated here on the record for the two rulings on the motions.
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     Thank you. Court will be in recess.
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              (10:36 a.m.)
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               I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
     from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
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     above-entitled matter.
               I further certify that the transcript fees and format
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     Date: December 20, 2024
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